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Abstract
While the existence of ﬁxed costs in entering asset markets is the leading rational-
ization of the “participation puzzle” —the fact that most households do not hold stocks,
despite the diversiﬁcation gains and the signiﬁcant risk-premium involved—, most moti-
vations of these ﬁxed costs are as incompatible with conventional portfolio theory as the
non participation itself. Nevertheless, we believe that these motivations are empirically
correct, and thus we are forced to explore alternatives to conventional portfolio theory.
We ﬁnd in Choquet expected utility theory a tool that is better equipped to deal with
more complex forms of ignorance than expected utility is.
Within such model, we are able to express the idea that staying out of the market may
be a rational response to the own ignorance. Within a Probit model for the 2001 Survey
of Consumer Finances, we show suggestive evidence in its favor.
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1“Everybody is ignorant, only on diﬀerent subjects.” Will Rogers
“We fear things in proportion to our ignorance of them.” Titus Livius
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is a well known fact that most households do not hold stocks (Mankiw and Zeldes (1991),
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)) perhaps just as well known as that the paradoxical nature of
this fact within conventional portfolio theory: an expected-utility maximizer would (almost)
always hold some of every asset.
The prevalent rationalization argues that the typical household refrains from holding
stocks because of the existence of ﬁxed costs which must be incurred when entering the
market. These ﬁxed costs may have many sources, including trading commissions, trading
time, learning costs regarding how the market operates, costs of choosing and monitoring
the appropriate portfolio, information costs, and psychological costs derived from the risk
involved, to name the most commonly mentioned in the literature.
Brennan (1975) oﬀers an early treatment of portfolio theory with transaction costs of this
sort. Allen and Gale (1994), on the other hand, point out that the limited participation
that these ﬁxed costs imply may help understand the excessive volatility of asset prices.
Given such potential importance for understanding the functioning of the economy, it is not
surprising that the subject has received much attention.
However, some authors (e.g., Yaron and Zhang (2000) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002))
have emphasized that the level of ﬁxed costs required to explain a big chunk of non partic-
ipators’ decision are actually very small. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) for instance, concludes
that US$50 would suﬃce to explain half of those decisions. The numbers these researchers
arrive at are indeed small enough so that any eﬀort to clarify and deﬁne with precision their
sources seems vacuous.
Nonetheless, this article holds a contrarian view. Even if trading commissions alone
were suﬃcient to explain a large part of non participants’ decisions, we would not feel
conﬁdent with such a theory at least because of the following:
1. Such theory would not explain why the households’ educational level is a very signiﬁ-
cant explanatory variable in all individual-data studies (see for instance Guiso et. al.
(2002), or our own measures in Section 5.) Some authors point out that this ﬁnding
2would be consistent with monitoring costs that decrease with education. While we
will elaborate more on this later on, we would like to stress that this ﬁnding cannot
be reconciled with the transaction fee interpretation of the ﬁxed costs.
2. Such theory would predict that participation would become universal should these
fees disappear. We don’t ﬁnd this prediction palatable, at least because participation
rates are very small even in countries where these fees are even lower or do not exist!
(e.g., around US$5 in Chile.)
Moreover, as Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) remarks, the fact that so small ﬁxed costs are
suﬃcient to explain non participation of most households is a consequence of their small
ﬁnancial wealth. In contrast to most portfolio choice theories, however, ﬁnancial wealth
itself is endogenous to the individual’s perception of value in his investment options. If
most people have a negative perception of ﬁnancial asset’s worthiness, then they would
choose to have low levels of ﬁnancial wealth and we could therefore be mislead to believe
that their choices are explained by the transaction fees instead of their perceptions.
Therefore, while ﬁxed-cost modelling can plausibly match observed participation rates,
and while trading commissions may in some countries/epochs match the implied ﬁxed cost
levels, it is clear that a fuller understanding of the non participation puzzle requires an
in-depth analysis of the sources of these ﬁxed costs beyond trading commissions.
For the ﬁrst part, if we wish to retain portfolio theory, where assets are bundles of
contingent consumption claims and investors are expected-utility maximizers with a given
ﬁnancial wealth, we need to dismiss psychological costs derived from the risk involved as
a potential explanation, because it is already accounted for in the form of risk aversion.
Risk aversion, as Section 2 shows, cannot explain non participation. We should also rule
out information costs in general, and learning costs regarding how the market operates in
particular, because an expected-utility maximizer always has a belief which rationalizes his
participation. In particular, an expected utility maximizer always knows her environment
in the sense that she can always imagine all possibilities, and holds probabilistic beliefs
over them. If reﬁning those beliefs by feeding them with information is worth the cost or
not, is something that would explain whether she ends up knowing a lot or little (becomes
“informed” or not) at the time the portfolio decision is made, but is not related to par-
ticipation per se. Strictly speaking, the same should be said of the costs of choosing and
3monitoring the appropriate portfolio, the word “appropriate” being the key. The investor
can always choose carelessly, and hold (without monitoring) until the money is needed; if
she chooses not to behave in this fashion is because she ﬁnds it worthwhile to incur these
costs, and hence they do not rationalize non participation. The ﬁxed cost theory, then, is
only coherent with a trading commission interpretation.
We ﬁnd it intuitive, on the other hand, to explain non participation on the grounds of
ignorance. Ignorance is a common motive, in ordinary life, to avoid some actions whose
outcome seems uncertain. Most people avoid getting involved in projects about which they
lack experience, knowledge or understanding, especially when they are perceived as risky.
The fact that most households do not hold stocks might be just a leading example of this:
many people are not familiar with stocks or, more generally, with sophisticated classes of
asset, and as a consequence avoid them. Modern ﬁnancial markets seem to be the arena
of “experts,” and the lay person seems to feel uncomfortable intruding.
There are many levels this ignorance can take. In the extreme, the person might be
unaware of the existence of stocks. Or, having a good idea of what stocks are, might not
know the basic mechanics (where to buy or sell, how to check prices, how to monitor, when
to sell). Or knowing all of the above, feel unconﬁdent on the sources of risk, and distrustful
on his choices (for instance, because she is aware of the fact that she cannot read ﬁnancial
statements). Financial illiterate people who are aware of their illiteracy may fall in this
category. Observe that all these cases may fall under some of the categories mentioned
in the literature: learning costs regarding how the market operates, costs of choosing and
monitoring the appropriate portfolio, information costs, and psychological costs derived
from the risk involved. What, then, are we contending?
Our main point is the following: While we think ignorance (i.e., lack of knowledge) is
indeed a strong determinant of the observed non-participation rates worldwide, we must
stress that this cannot be said within an expected-utility based theory, like conventional
portfolio theory. The reason is that expected utility theory cannot describe certain forms of
ignorance, like the a state in which an individual knows so little that he cannot even imagine
sensible meanings for words like stocks, yield, and the like (a phenomenon which is currently
studied under the name of unawareness,) nor for that matter can describe certain reactions
to the awareness of the own ignorance, like the avoidance of activities where the individual
feels particularly ignorant (a behavior related to the notion of ambiguity aversion.)
4Hence, taking ignorance seriously as a determinant of behavior seems to require the
abandonment of expected utility theory (or its extension, if the reader prefers.) We do
so in Section 3, and remark (as Dow and Werlang (1992) showed) that ambiguity aversion
can explain non participation. Ambiguity aversion since its conception has been informally
related to the subject’s awareness of her lack of relevant information, i.e., awareness of the
own ignorance. Recently, this connection has also been formalized (Ghirardato (2001)).
In search of a test that could disentangle between trading commissions and ignorance-
based solutions to the puzzle, we observe that the former implies heterogeneity exclusively
in the level of wealth, while the latter on the level of ignorance itself. Financial illiteracy
is unobservable (at least in the data available to us, namely the 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances.) However, since ignorance and formal education seem to be related, we suggest
that this theory can rationalize the strong empirical connection between education and
participation, which we further document. Although we are not able to perform a direct
test to compare these theories, we believe the evidence indeed points strongly towards an
ignorance-based theory of non participation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the fact, and shows
within a model why it is puzzling. It also shows within the same model why information
acquisition is not a proper motivation of the ﬁxed costs the literature on rationalizing
the puzzle introduces. Section 3 brieﬂy introduces the idea of ambiguity aversion, and
its representation through non-additive beliefs. This section contains a rudimentary, basic
exposition of the theory, and hence it can be safely skipped by the reader already familiarized
with it. Section 4 delineates a model for non-participation within those lines. Section 5
discusses the evidence through the lens of a probit model for the participation decision.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The puzzle
Typical households do not hold stocks. For instance, only 19% of US households had any
stocks in their portfolios in 1998, according to the Survey of Consumer Finances (hence-
forth SCF). The ﬁgure rises to 21% in the 2001 survey, in the peak of the technology bub-
ble. Stock in the SCF means directly held stock. Many households, however, hold stock
indirectly, through stock mutual funds, investment retirement accounts (IRAs), Keoghs
5(tax-deferred retirement plans for self-employed individuals) invested in stock, thrift-type
retirement accounts invested in stock, or other managed-assets with equity interest (an-
nuities, trusts, MIAs). The union of these assets is called equity in the SCF. Again,
considering equity, participation rates are still far from universal; in the 2001 survey, for
instance, 52% of households held any equity. Moreover, it is only safe to think that some
of these households may be unaware of the fact that they are indirectly holding stocks.
Overall, these ﬁgures are similar to those obtained from other sources, and are likely to be
much smaller in countries with less developed asset markets.
This fact is a puzzle within conventional portfolio theory, which is built on three major
assumptions: (a) investors are expected utility maximizers, (b) investors are price-takers,
and (c) assets are viewed as contingent promises of future consumption.
Suppose there are K risky assets, indexed by k =1 ,2,...,K, and one riskless asset,
call it asset k =0 . There are two dates, t =0 ,1,a n dS possible states of Nature, s =
1,...,S,contemplated for date t =1 , each with a probability πs. Each asset is completely
characterized by its contingent payment ﬂow, rsk. If the price of asset k is labeled qk,t h e n
ρsk ≡ rsk
qk is the gross ex post return of asset k in state s.W e w r i t e µk for E [ρk],a n dµ0
for the risk free gross rate of return. Also, say that ak is the number of units of security k
the investor holds in his portfolio, and W0 his initial wealth, and deﬁne αk ≡
akqk
W0 as asset
k’s portfolio weight. Investing $W0 in the portfolio
³
1 −
PK
k=1 αk,α1,α2,...,αK
´
yields a
date-1 consumption of W0
h
µ0 +
PK
k=1 αk (ρk − µ0)
i
. Then, the familiar portfolio problem
is:
max
{α1,...,αK}
E
"
u
Ã
W0
"
µ0 +
K X
k=1
αk (ρk − µ0)
#!#
(1)
with an associated ﬁrst-order condition:
W0E
£
u0 (c)(ρk − µ0)
¤
=0 (2)
If zero holdings of the risky assets k =1 ,...,K were optimal, we would have for each of
them:
E [ρk] − µ0 =0 (3)
This is to say, an investor would not participate in the risky assets market if and only
if he perceived a null risk premium. It is also clear that for any asset k, Equation (2)
6admits a unique solution (observet h a tr i s ka v e r s i o ni m p l i e st h a tu0 (c) is monotonically
decreasing and therefore Equation (2) has a unique, continuous solution) which only by a
curious coincidence would be exactly 0.
This results derives from the fundamental assumptions mentioned above. Indeed, by
(c) assets have an instrumental demand; this marks a severe diﬀerence from the theory of
demand for regular goods, which are demanded by themselves. By (a) we know that at a
riskless position every expected utility maximizer, no matter how risk averse, is locally risk
neutral. Coupled with (b) these assumptions imply that the existence of any risk premia
would induce the investor to bear risk.
Understanding the generality of this result, it may be preferable to continue our discus-
sion within a particular example. We will consider the case of negative-exponential utility
function, two assets (a risky and a riskless one) where the gross return of the risky asset is
normally distributed with mean µ1 and variance σ2. In such a case, the expected utility of
investing a fraction α1 of W0 on the risky asset is given by1:
E
£
−e−Ac¤
= −exp
µ
−AW0 ((1 − α1)µ0 + α1µ)+
A2
2
α2
1W2
0σ2
¶
(4)
which is maximized at
α∗
1 =
µ1 − µ0
AW0σ2 (5)
Again, it is clearly the case that the investor would decides not to participate in the
r i s k y - a s s e t ’ sm a r k e to n l yi ft h ep e r c e i v e dr i s kp r e m i u m(µ − µ0) were zero.
The existence of a ﬁx e dc o s tt oe n t e rt h er i s k ya s s e tm a r k e t rationalizes non-participation:
if it costs δ to have the right to buy any of it, then staying out is preferred as long as the
beneﬁt overweights the cost, that is, if:
−exp
Ã
−
1
2
2µ0A(W0 − δ)σ2 +( µ0 − µ1)
2
σ2
!
≤−exp(−AW0µ0) (6)
which occurs if:
δ ≥
1
2
(µ1 − µ0)
2
µ0Aσ2 (7)
The required risk-premium to participate is now bounded away from zero: it must be
larger than
p
2δµ0Aσ2. Hence, in the presence of ﬁxed participation costs, the portfolio
1An expression arrived at by using the characteristic function of the normal distribution.
7weight given to the risky asset is given by:
α∗
1 =



µ−µ0
A(W−δ)σ2 if δ ≤ 1
2
(µ0−µ)2
µ0Aσ2
0 otherwise
(8)
However, motivating this δ by making reference to information acquisition costs is not
correct within this model. If we were to explicitly incorporate the possibility of information
acquisition , we could indeed characterize a situation in which information is not worth its
cost and therefore not acquired. However, the optimum portfolio in the absence of this
information would not be riskless.
To see this, consider the following example. Suppose the investor, prior to buying his
portfolio, could pay (or more generally incur a total cost of ) δ in order to observe the value
of the random variable e x. Observing it is valuable because it constitutes a (noisy) signal
of the true ex post return on the asset. In particular, suppose e x and the ex-post return
on the asset e ρ have a joint normal distribution, and that its marginal probability density
function with respect to the asset’s return (the prior) has a mean µ1 and variance σ2,a s
before. For simplicity, further assume the following structure:
e ρ = e x +e ε (9a)
e x ∼ N
¡
µx,σ2
x
¢
(9b)
e ε ∼ N
¡
0,σ2
ε
¢
(9c)
where e x and e ε are independent.
Learning the value of x does not aﬀect the asset’s return but helps predicting it, for the
updated belief over e ρ becomes:
ρ|x ∼ N
µ
µ1σ2
x + xσ2
ε
σ2
x + σ2
ε
,
σ2
xσ2
ε
σ2
x + σ2
ε
¶
(10)
which is diﬀerent from the prior:
ρ ∼ N
¡
µ,σ2
x + σ2
ε
¢
= N
¡
µ,σ2¢
(11)
Hence, if the investor had access to this information, he would use it, that is, his asset
demand would depend on the realization x,a sf o l l o w s :
α∗
1 (x)=
µσ2
x+xσ2
ε
σ2
x+σ2
ε − µ0
AW
σ2
xσ2
ε
σ2
x+σ2
ε
(12)
8resulting in an expected utility, conditional on x,o f
E [u|x]=−exp


−
1
2
2µ0AW
σ2
xσ2
ε
σ2
x+σ2
ε +
³
µ0 −
µσ2
x+xσ2
ε
σ2
x+σ2
ε
´2
σ2
xσ2
ε
σ2
x+σ2
ε


 (13)
Hence, the value of acquiring information from an ex-ante perspective is given by:
Ex
·
max
α(x)
Eρ|x [u|x]
¸
− max
α Eρ [u] (14)
If this diﬀerence is larger than the information cost δ, the investor would acquire the
information, otherwise he would not. Yet, in this latter case, he would not stay out of the
market. Rather, he would choose the best portfolio as judged by his prior beliefs given by
(11), and will spend the fraction α∗
1 of his wealth given by (5) on the risky asset.
As a matter of fact, in this model any uncertainty —i.e., ignorance— about how the
market operates, what the asset payoﬀs’ structure is, and so on, ultimately translates into
uncertainty about the ﬁnal consumption to be obtained with or without the asset. All those
uncertainties are built into the prior beliefs. To say that it is obviously the case that one
must get information before entering the market is equivalent to say that δ is low relative
to (14) for any investor, a situation in which all pay the cost and participate (with the
exception of the knife-edge case in which the perceived risk-premium is zero). Otherwise,
some are informed, some are not, but still all participate.
Therefore, the ﬁxed-cost used in the literature to solve the puzzle cannot originate in
information-acquisition activities.
When looking for alternative sources of transaction costs, payments to intermediaries
obviously stand out. However, the observed structures of commissions and transaction fees
around the globe do not seem to accommodate the ﬁxed-cost pattern; on the contrary, they
generally are an increasing function of volume. In view of this, one is forced to look for
alternative explanations.
Section (4) below will attempt to reconstruct the idea that ignorance (or the costs of
abandoning it) is indeed a plausible account of the Participation Puzzle. Yet, building the
argument requires a departure from EU theory, which the next section describes.
93 Non additive beliefs2
This section describes brieﬂy the main idea and tools of the theory of Choquet Expected
Utility. There are other theories that rationalize non-additive beliefs as well (for a survey,
see Ghirardato 1993). The reader who is familiar with this theory may prefer to jump to
Section 4.
The case for generalizing expected utility theory to non-additive beliefs is, perhaps,
best motivated through Ellsberg’s paradox. A version of it considers an individual who is
presented two urns (A and B) with 100 chips each, either red (r)o rb l u e( b). The individual
is told that urn A contains exactly 50 red and 50 blue chips, and that urn B also contains
only red and blue chips, but he is not told in which proportions. The individual is supposed
to bet on a color: one chip is extracted, and if it matches the color of his choosing, he wins
ap r i z eo fv a l u ex.I f t h e c o l o r i s d i ﬀerent, he gets 0. Before betting on the color, however,
he is asked to choose the urn from where the chip will be extracted.
Most individuals in experiments like this declare to be indiﬀerent about the color to
bet on, but prefer to bet in urn A, the one with known composition. This behavior is
inconsistent with expected utility. To see this, let us compute the expected utilities of each
alternative. The following list indicates the expected utility of betting in urns A,B and
colors r,b :
E [u](A;r)=P(rA)u(x)+P(bA)u(0) (15a)
E [u](A;b)=P(rA)u(0) + P(bA)u(x) (15b)
E [u](B;r)=P(rB)u(x)+P(bB)u(0) (15c)
E [u](B;b)=P(rB)u(0) + P(bB)u(x) (15d)
If the individual is indiﬀerent between colors in both urns, he must associate a 50%
chance to obtaining each color from either urn:
E [u](A;r)=E [u](A;b) ⇒ P(rA)=P(bA)=
1
2
(16a)
E [u](B;r)=E [u](B;b) ⇒ P(rB)=P(bB)=
1
2
(16b)
This implies, however, that he must associate the same utility level to both urns.
⇒ E [u](A)=
1
2
[u(x)+u(0)] = E [u](B) (17)
2This section draws shamelessly from Zurita (2004).
10Hence, the individual must be indiﬀerent among both urns, contrary to what is typically
observed. Taken from a diﬀerent perspective, the indiﬀerence between colors in A means:
E [u](A)=
1
2
[u(x)+u(0)] (18)
On the other hand, the utility of choosing urn B is given by:
E [u](B)=m a x{P(rB)u(x)+P(bB)u(0),P(rB)u(0) + P(bB)u(x)} (19)
Thus, if P(rB) < 1
2, the individual would prefer to bet on blue and E [u](B)=
P(rB)u(0)+(1 − P(rB))u(x) > 1
2 [u(x)+u(0)]. If P(rB) > 1
2, the individual would prefer
to bet on red and E [u](B)=P(rB)u(x)+( 1− P(rB))u(0) > 1
2 [u(x)+u(0)]. Therefore,
there is no scenario we can think of in which urn A is preferred to urn B if the individual
associates a 50% chance to each color on A. If he is indiﬀerent between colors in B, he
must be indiﬀerent among urns. If he is not indiﬀerent between colors in B, then he must
prefer B, contradicting the evidence.
Schmeidler’s observation is that we may disassociate indiﬀerence between colors —no
reason to prefer one color over another— from indiﬀerence between urns. Instead of asso-
ciating a “probability” to each event, let us say that the individual associates a degree of
conﬁdence to the occurrence of a state, not necessarily represented by a probability:
E [u](A;r)=v(rA)u(x)+( 1− v(rA))u(0) (20a)
E [u](A;b)=( 1 − v(bA))u(0) + v(bA)u(x) (20b)
E [u](B;r)=v(rB)u(x)+( 1− v(rB))u(0) (20c)
E [u](B;b)=( 1 − v(bB))u(0) + v(bB)u(x) (20d)
Indiﬀerence between colors implies:
E [u](A;r)=E [u](A;b) ⇒ v(rA)=v(bA) (21a)
E [u](B;r)=E [u](B;b) ⇒ v(rB)=v(bB) (21b)
However, urn A is preferred to urn B as long as v(rA) >v (rB):
E [u](A;r) >E[u](B;r)
⇔ [v(rA) − v(rB)]u(x) > [v(rA) − v(rB)]u(0) (22)
11The interpretation given to the v(·) function is that it represents both, a degree of
conﬁdence in the occurrence of an event and a measure of the ambiguity that the decision-
maker perceives in the decision problem. Urn A represents a less ambiguous choice than
urn B, because the individual has more information and hence more conﬁdence in his beliefs,
even though in neither case he has a reason to believe that one color is more likely than the
other one.
The diﬀerence with respect to expected utility theory is that v(rA)+v(bA) 6=1 ,t h a ti s ,
the belief is not additive. Mathematically, the belief is not represented by a probability
function but by a capacity.L e t S denote a set of states of nature, and 2S the set of all
subsets (called “events”) of S.A c a p a c i t y v is a function that associates to each possible
event a number in [0,1],v:2 S → [0,1],with the following properties:
1. v(∅)=0 ,v (S)=1 .
2. A ⊂ B ⇒ v(A) ≤ v(B) ∀A,B ∈ 2S.
A probability function is a capacity that satisﬁes the additional property of additivity:
v(A ∪ B)=v(A)+v(B) − v(A ∩ B).
A behavioral foundation for using probabilities as representation of beliefs comes from
Savage’s (1957) seminal work. Savage considered the case of a decision maker who does
not know the consequence of each decision available to him, but is capable of imagining
a set of alternative states of the world S, and a set of possible consequences C from his
acts, F. Each act is a map from S to C, that is, the individual associates to an act a
list of conditional consequences, one for each state. Savage makes a series of assumptions
about behavior, and proves that the preferences of an individual that satisﬁes them have
an expected utility representation:
f Â g ⇐⇒
Z
u(f)dP >
Z
u(g)dP (23)
where u(c) is the standard Bernoulli utility index and P is a probability measure over S.
Choquet Expected Utility can be obtained by relaxing one of Savages’s axioms, inde-
pendence, requiring it to hold only for comonotonic acts, that is, those acts that induce the
same ranking of states. Under co-monotonic independence, the preference relation over
acts has an expected utility representation, as:
f Â g ⇐⇒
Z
u(f)dv >
Z
u(g)dv (24)
12E v(E)
∅ 0
{1}
1
4
{2}
1
4
{1,2} 1
Table 1: A Capacity
where the integral is not taken over a probability but over a capacity v.
The lack of additivity, however, implies that the usual integral cannot be applied here.
The appropriate integral concept is that of Choquet (which explains the name of the theory).
Let f (C)={c1,...,c n} be the set of consequences under act f,w h e r eu(ci) ≥ u(ci+1) for
all i. The Choquet integral is given by:
Z
u(f)dv =
n−1 X
i=1
[u(ci) − u(ci+1)]v


i [
j=1
Aj

 + u(cn) (25)
where Aj = f−1 (cj) is the event in which consequence cj obtains under act f.
In the two-state urn example that introduced this section, this deﬁnition means that as
long as v(r·)+v(b·) < 1, the higher-utility scenario is weighted by v(·) and the lower-utility
scenario by 1−v(·), that is, the degree of conﬁdence in its occurrence plus all non-assigned
weight.
If there are two events, this implies indiﬀerence curves over risky consumption proﬁles
that are kinked (an hence non diﬀerentiable) at the certainty line. For instance, let S =
{1,2} and C = IR+. Then, each act is a bundle (c1,c 2). Suppose beliefs have the form
Then, if f is such that c1 >c 2,
Z
u(f)dv =[ u(c1) − u(c2)]v(1) + u(c2)
= v(1)u(c1)+[ 1− v(1)]u(c2)
=
1
4
u(c1)+
3
4
u(c2) (26)
However, if f is such that c2 >c 1,
Z
u(f)dv =
3
4
u(c1)+
1
4
u(c2) (27)
The Choquet integral, then, adds the unassigned weight 1 − v(A) − v(Ac) to the worst
possible outcome. The certainty line separates the cases where state 1 is associated to the
worst outcome from the cases where it is state 2. This is depicted in Picture 1.
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Picture 1: CEU indiﬀerence curves.
The kink is the feature of the model that will be exploited here, for it implies that there
is a range of state prices at which the ambiguity averse individual will not be willing to take
any risks.
One may object that, after all, this is just a limiting form of risk aversion; that even
though such a range cannot be obtained under EU theory, it could well be approximated by
a strong curvature of the indiﬀerence curve. However, the CEU model presents a big diﬀer-
ence: a risk-averse EU-maximizer is risk-averse in every dimension —this is, regarding any
risks or states—, while a CEU needs not hold equally non-additive beliefs in every respect. In
eﬀect, the same individual may hold non-additive beliefs with respect to one variable and ad-
ditive with respect to another. The model can thus rationalize the behavior of a person that
bets heavily on a casino and at the same time buys life and health insurance. For instance,
consider the case of a person who entertains the following possibilities about the following
day: {it rains-there is an earthquake, it rains-there isn’t an earthquake, it doesn’t rain-there
is an earthquake, it doesn’t rain-there isn’t an earthquake}≡ {RE,RN,DE,DN}. The
following capacity is additive with regard to the possibility of rain, but non-additive with
regard to the possibility of an earthquake (the 3-state events are omitted for short):
In this example, the individual associates a probability of 70% to rain (the event
{RE,RN}) and 30% to not rain (the event {DE,DN}), and therefore he will behave as a
regular EU-maximizer if faced with decisions whose consequences depend solely on whether
14Event v(E)
∅ 0
{RE} .07
{RN} .1
{DE} .03
{DN} .1
Event v(E)
{RE,RN} .7
{DE,DN} .3
{RE,DE} .2
{RN,DN} .3
{RE,RN,DE,DN} 1
Table 2: Another capacity
it will rain or not. However, his degree of conﬁdence in an earthquake happening is 20%
(the event {RE,DE}), while an earthquake not happening of 30% (the event {RN,DN}),
and hence he will behave as a CEU-maximizer in decisions whose consequences depend on
the occurrence of an earthquake. The remaining 50% can be interpreted as the degree to
which the situation seems ambiguous to him. While this person will behave as very risk
averse in situations that depend on the occurrence of an earthquake, he will not do so in
situations that depend on the rain. Hence, this example illustrates that the generalization
presented by CEU is not trivial.
This in an important dimension of CEU theory to the present paper, because it al-
lows us to represent a situation in which people are knowledgeable or ignorant in diﬀer-
ent dimensions. In particular, we are interested in the comparison of behavior between
ﬁnancial-literate and ﬁnancial-illiterate individuals.
4 The model
Dow and Werlang (1992) proved that there is a range of state prices at which a CEU-
maximizer does not participate in the market of a risky security whose payoﬀs depend on
events that are ambiguous to him. In the present section, we exploit this idea to represent
an economy formed by an heterogeneous group of investors, who diﬀer in their wealth and
in the extent of their ignorance regarding the risky asset (henceforth referred simply as
ignorance or ﬁnancial illiteracy).possibly because of diﬀerences in their abilities to read
ﬁnancial statements, understanding of the workings of the market, their participants and
risks, the applicable tax structure, and the like.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a two-date economy (t =0 ,1),a n dt w o 3 payoﬀ-relevant states,
3We would have preferred to retain the model used in Section 2. However, to the best of our knowledge
there is no tractable counterpart to the normal-exponential setting with non-additive beliefs. In particular,
15S = {s1,s 2}. There are two assets, k =0 ,1, described by the date-2 payoﬀ matrix of
dimension S × K :
R =

 rr 1
rr

 (28)
Asset 1, whose date-1 payoﬀs correspond to the ﬁrst column of R, is risk-free, while asset
2, whose date-1 payoﬀs appear in the second column of R, is risky. Assume for concreteness
that r1 >r . W ed e n o t eb yqk the date-0 price of asset k as before, and normalize q0 =1 ,
so that r is the risk-free rate. Observe that these prices admit no arbitrage opportunities
i fa n do n l yi fq1 ∈
¡
1, r1
r
¢
. The aggregate (per capita) supply of the risky asset is 1.
Hence, a date-0 wealth of $W spent on a portfolio
³
1 − αα
´
yields a contingent
consumption proﬁle of:
c1 = W
µ
(1 − α)
r
1
+ α
r1
q1
¶
(29)
c2 = W
µ
(1 − α)
r
1
+ α
r
q1
¶
in states 1 and 2, respectively.
There is a continuum of risk-averse individuals with Lebesgue measure 1. Individual
i ∈ I maximizes the following Choquet-expected utility from date-1 consumption:
Ei
£
u
¡
ci
1,c i
2
¢¤
=

   
   
vi (s1)u
¡
ci
1
¢
+
¡
1 − vi (s1)
¢
u
¡
ci
2
¢
if ci
1 >c i
2
¡
1 − vi (s2)
¢
u
¡
ci
1
¢
+ vi (s2)u
¡
ci
2
¢
if ci
1 <c i
2
u
¡
ci
1
¢
if ci
1 = ci
2
(30)
where ci
s refers to consumption by individual i at date 1, contingent on state s materializing.
All individuals have the same Bernoulli function u(·), which in what follows will be assumed
to be negative exponential. They diﬀer in their beliefs, represented by the convex capacity
vi (·).
We would like to speak of “ignorance” as the variable that characterizes individuals,
and to relate it to the degree of non additivity of the individuals’ beliefs. This associa-
tion is both, intuitive and theoretically justiﬁable. Recent research by Ghirardato (2001)
shows that the behavior of an individual who lacks a complete description of the state
tractable models can be built with E-capacities wich are deﬁned over compact spaces (Eichberger and Kelsey
(1999)), whereas the normal distribution has an unbounded support. Hence, we chose a ﬁnite state space
a sas e c o n db e s t .
16space (because he is unaware of some variables or facts, i.e. ignorant) and is aware of his
unawareness, can be represented by a maximization of an expected utility with respect to
a non additive belief over the complete state space. One example of such non additive
belief would be a convex capacity, which expresses ambiguity aversion. This special case
corresponds to one of the possible behavioral reactions to the own ignorance, the one that
Titus Livius describes in the opening quotation. We are thus tempted to write something
of the following sort:
vi (s1)=
1
2
(1 − i)=vi (s2) (31)
whereby the more ignorant, the less additive the investor’s belief:
1 − vi (s1) − vi (s2)=i (32)
However, we also ﬁnd it helpful to relate the variables included in the model more
directly to the variables we can observe in the available data that next section describes.
Clearly, general ignorance (if there is such thing) is not observable, much less the particular
ignorance relevant to the portfolio decision we are thinking of. The closest variable in the
dataset is actually formal education (whether or not the individual completed high school
or college) which is clearly unspeciﬁc for our purposes. Yet, these variables should be
positively related (a fuller discussion is postponed till next section.) For this reason, we
will speak instead of education (e ∈ [0,1]), treat it as lack of ignorance, and consequently
relate it to the degree of nonadditivity of beliefs as:
ve (s1)=
1
2
e = ve (s2) (33)
Hence, an investor with education e chooses his portfolio according to:
max
{α}
E [u(c1,c 2)] =

   
   
1
2e(−exp(−Ac1)) +
¡
1 − 1
2e
¢
(−exp(−Ac2)) if c1 >c 2
¡
1 − 1
2e
¢
(−exp(−Ac1)) + 1
2e(−exp(−Ac2)) if c1 <c 2
−exp(−Ac1) if c1 = c2
(34)
The extreme cases are given by e =1 , an investor with the highest education who has
additive beliefs and is therefore a regular expected utility maximizer; and e =0at the other
extreme, an investor who has maximally nonadditive beliefs, whose preferences collapse to:
E [u(c1,c 2)] = min{c1,c 2} (35)
17This is to say, she chooses by looking at worst-case scenarios.
Education and wealth will be assumed to be (exogenously) correlated in the population.
T h ee x o g e n e i t yi si m p e r a t i v eo n c ew er e s i g nn o tto model explicitly the education decision.
We are forced to do so because unfortunately there is no obvious counterpart to Bayes’
rule within non additive beliefs that would allow the study of belief change yet (although
signiﬁcant progress has been made, as exempliﬁed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and
Cohen et al (1999)). In particular, we assume the following distribution:
f (e,W)=



1
a if e ∈
£
max
©
0, W
a − a
ª
,min
©W
a ,1
ª¤
0 otherwise
(36)
This distribution is uniform-like, except for the fact that its support is a parallelogram,
a ss h o w ni nP i c t u r e2 :
W
e
a 0
1
2a W
e
a 0
1
2a
Picture 2: The support of f(a,W)
Notice that the parameter a deﬁnes the covariance between education and wealth, as
Cov(e,W)= 1
12a. The choice of this distribution obeys exclusively to tractability.
Assuming c1 ≥ c2 (a condition that will be satisﬁed in equilibrium), each investor’s
problem becomes:
max
{α}
−
1
2
eexp
µ
−A
µ
Wα
r1
q1
+ W (1 − α)
r
1
¶¶
−
µ
1 −
1
2
e
¶
exp
µ
−A
µ
Wα
r
q1
+ W (1 − α)
r
1
¶¶
which is maximized at
α∗ =
q1
AW (r1 − r)
ln
µ
(r1 − rq1)e
r(q1 − 1)(2 − e)
¶
(37)
18Since α∗ ≥ 0 i fa n do n l yi f
e ≥ 2r
q1 − 1
r1 − r
≡ k, (38)
e ≥ k is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an investor to participate in the risky asset
market. The critical value k is independent of wealth because of the special nature of the
negative exponential function. This is unrealistic but considerably simpliﬁes computations.
Thus, the proportion of participants is:
2
Z a
ak
Z W
a
k
1
a
dedW +
Z a+ak
a
Z 1
k
1
a
dedW ≡ 1 − k (39)
and the aggregate asset demand is given by:
Z 1
k
1
A(r1 − r)
ln
µ
(r1 − rq1)e
r(q1 − 1)(2 − e)
¶
de (40)
=
−1
(r1 − r)A
ln
Ã
(r1 − rq1)r(q1 − 1)(−2+k)
2 kk (−r1 + rq1)
k
(−r1 + rq1)
2 rk (−2+k)
k (q1 − 1)
k
!
.
In a Walrasian equilibrium q1 satisﬁes:
−1
(r1 − r)A
ln
Ã
(r1 − rq1)r(q1 − 1)(−2+k)
2 kk (−r1 + rq1)
k
(−r1 + rq1)
2 rk (−2+k)
k (q1 − 1)
k
!
=1 , (41)
and hence the equilibrium risky-asset price is:
q∗
1 =
1
2
µ
r1 + r
r
¶
−
1
2
µ
r1 − r
r
¶p
1 − exp{−(r1 − r)A} ≤
r1
r
(42)
It is easily veriﬁed that q∗
1 doesn’t admit arbitrage opportunities, that it is independent
of a (the average wealth), and that it is decreasing in A, the degree of risk-aversion.
Evaluating, we have that the equilibrium cut-oﬀ educational level is given by:
k∗ =1−
p
1 − exp{−(r1 − r)A}, (43)
clearly bounded away from zero and decreasing in A. This latter result may seem unintu-
itive, but it is easily understood once one realized that A increases the expected return on
the risky asset, increasing participation.
In turn, for a ﬁxed wealth level W, the participation rate is monotonically nondecreasing:

      
      
0 for W ≤ ak∗
1 − k∗ a
W for W ∈ [ak∗,a]
a(1−k∗)
2a−W for W ∈ [a,a(1 + k∗)]
1 for W ≥ a(1 + k∗)
Within this equilibrium, we also have that:
19• education and wealth are positively correlated,
• participation increases with education for a ﬁxed level of wealth, and hence they are
conditionally-positively correlated, and
• participation increases with education, and hence they are unconditionally-positively
correlated.
All these features are found in the data, as Section 5 describes. There is an extra
feature of the data which is absent from the present model: the fact that for a ﬁxed level
of education, the participation rate is increasing in wealth. This absence is the combined
consequence of not modelling explicitly the education decision, and assuming a constant
absolute risk aversion Bernoulli function. The present section, however, has shown that we
can think of asset market equilibria where the remaining features are the result of hetero-
geneity in ignorance (education) and an ambiguity-aversion that is increasing in ignorance
(decreasing in education), without an explicit recourse to ﬁxed costs, and in particular to
transaction fees.
5 Some evidence
Empirical studies of participation have relied mostly on discrete choice models like Logit and
Probit, run with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Panel Study
on Income Dynamics in the case of the U.S. We will examine data from the SCF. The SCF
is a survey of the balance sheet, pension, income, and other demographic characteristics
of approximately 4,500 U.S. families, selected with procedures that assure representation
of all economic strata4 .T h e ﬁrst survey was conducted in the early 1960s and has been
conducted triennially since 1983, with the sponsorship of the US Department of Treasury
and the Federal Reserve Board. The reported data consists really of ﬁve complete datasets,
as missing data are multiply imputed. We did not have access to the raw data, so all
statistics reported in this section correspond to the union of the ﬁve imputations, from the
2001 survey.
Table 3 sketches the characteristics of households holding diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial
assets: directly-held stocks, equity and liquid assets (transaction accounts). Arguably, the
4For a description of the methodology, see Kennickell (1998, 1999).
20Age Education Annual Networth Financial Non Financial
(Years) (Years) Income Assets Assets
All families
Median 47 13 40,089 86,100 21,930 97,500
Mean 49 13 69,122 395,827 190,651 259,691
Stockholders (1)
Median 48 16 77,093 385,200 180,860 231,300
Mean 50 15 144,242 1,105,464 603,710 602,526
Equity holders (2)
Median 46 14 62,703 201,320 80,780 163,000
Mean 48 14 103,093 661,510 341,109 401,982
Liquid asset holders (3)
Median 47 13 30,000 104,700 43,172 111,150
Mean 49 13 209,086 432,661 74,228 282,697
Table 3: Characterization of ﬁnancial market participants by instruments held (2001 dollars)
Source: Constructed from information contained in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
(1): Households having ﬁnancial assets invested in directly-held stocks
(2): Households having ﬁnancial assets invested in stocks (including directly-held, stock mutual funds,
IRAs/Keoghs invested in stock).
(3): Housholds having liquid ﬁnancial assets, deﬁn e da sa l lt y p e so ft r a n s a c t i o n sa c c o u n t s( c h e c k i n ga c c o u n t s ,
saving accounts, money-market accounts, and call account at brokerages).
level of ﬁnancial knowledge required to correctly understand these assets is the highest for
stocks and the lowest for transaction accounts, the simplest type of ﬁnancial asset included
in the SCF. As expected, large diﬀerences exist between these groups. Median stockholders
have higher levels of networth, ﬁnancial wealth5 and education than median holders of equity
or liquid assets. This is coherent with the evidence found in previous studies. On the other
hand, education is highly correlated with both wealth and networth.
Table 4 characterizes stockholders by quintiles of networth. Some interesting results
emerge. In the ﬁrst column we see that the percentage of stockholders is monotonically
increasing in the quintiles of networth, the highest quintile having a participation rate 10
times higher than the ﬁrst. However, in the second column we see that average stock’s
load in portfolios is much more homogeneous. On the other hand, education and networth
5All measures of networth and wealth include only physical and ﬁnancial assets, excluding human capital
or the future income ﬂo w sa s s o c i a t e dt oi t .
21% Stock- Stocks/Fi- Stocks/ Stocks Average education % of college graduates
holders nancial assets Networth (dollar value) Stockholders Non Stockholders Non
All households 21.3 31.8 17.4 192,078 14.7 12.7 59.2 27.2
Quintile 1 4.5 29.8 -35.2 2,654 13.9 11.8 37.5 15.5
Quintile 2 8.0 29.7 17.6 4,519 13.8 12.4 36.6 19.6
Quintile 3 13.0 29.0 15.7 14,579 14.1 12.7 48.7 27.7
Quintile 4 27.2 20.2 9.8 24,411 14.1 13.3 50.8 36.6
Quintile 5 53.9 32.5 17.8 363,457 15.2 14.3 71.2 50.3
Table 4: Characterization of Stock Holders by Quintiles of Networth (2001 dollars)
Source: Constructed from information contained in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
are monotonically, positively and strongly related to each other. More interestingly for
our purposes, for each quintile stockholders are in average more educated than non stock-
holders, both in terms of years of formal studies and in their likelihood of being college
graduates. Thus, a positive marginal relationship between education and the participation
rate is apparent even after controlling for networth. As we will see shortly, this relationship
persists in the econometric analysis after controlling for a set of additional variables.
Finally, Table 5 presents the share of stockholders by educational level, splitting the
sample in deciles of networth. As in Table 4, for a given decile the proportion of stockhold-
ers increases (although not monotonically) with education. For example, while 0% of the
households that did not complete high school in the ﬁrst decile hold stocks, the share raises
to 10% among college graduates. Notice also that the same applies for a given educational
level as networth rises.
Much in line with previous studies (Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2000; Bertaut and
Haliassos, 1996), we estimate several Probit models for the households’ decision of directly
holding stocks or equity to see whether the relations found in Tables 2-5 are robust. In
these models, the decision is taken to be determined by wealth, education, work type and
variables that describe demographically the household.
The fact that missing data are multiply imputed obliges some extra care when handling
the dataset Multiple Estimation is a procedure for handling missing data that provides
information that can be used to estimate the extra variability due to unknown missing
v a r i a b l e s .T h et e c h n i q u eu s e ss t o c h a s t i cm u l t i v a r i a t em e t h o d st or e p l a c et h em i s s i n gv a l u e s
with two or more values that are generated to simulate their distribution. As described by
22No high school diploma High school diploma Some college College degree
Decile 1 0.0 7.2 5.5 10.3
Decile 2 0.5 3.3 5.0 10.1
Decile 3 2.1 3.5 9.5 12.6
Decile 4 4.2 7.6 12.5 15.2
Decile 5 1.7 6.8 19.6 18.3
Decile 6 11.3 10.8 10.8 22.8
Decile 7 19.0 14.7 23.8 18.9
Decile 8 12.4 33.0 24.8 38.8
Decile 9 25.9 30.6 38.9 52.9
Decile 10 38.5 43.4 62.1 68.9
Table 5: Percentage of Stock Holders by Deciles of Networth and Educational Level (2001
dollars)
Source: Constructed from information contained in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Phillips Montalto and Sung (1996), multiple imputation increases eﬃciency in estimation,
as well as reducing the non-response bias. The use of multiply imputed data provides a
basis for more valid inference and tests of signiﬁcance. If only one of the ﬁve datasets
(implicates) contained in the survey were used, the variance estimate would underestimate
the variance, and estimated coeﬃcients would be biased. Thus, a combined estimation of the
ﬁve implicates is required. Rubin (1987) proposes a methodology to derive estimates from
datasets containing several implicates. Roughly speaking, the method estimates separate
regressions for each of the ﬁve implicates. The best point estimate for the parameter is the
simple average of the point estimates derived independently for each of the ﬁve implicates.
The best variance estimate is the average of the variance estimates derived independently
from each of the ﬁve implicates (which is labeled as the “within” imputation variance),
plus an estimate of the “between” imputation variance, adjusted due to the use of a ﬁnite
number of imputations.
Several regressions, using Probit estimations with robust Huber/White covariances with
data taken from the 2001 SCF, are presented in Table 6. The dependent variables are
dummies that take the value of 1 if the household has the corresponding asset in his ﬁnancial
portfolio (equity or stocks). In all estimations, households that do not hold liquid assets
(transaction accounts) are excluded, as we are interested in households that, holding a simple
type of ﬁnancial asset in their portfolio, choose to hold (not to hold) a more sophisticated
23asset .
Results across estimations are pretty robust. Most results are also coherent with pre-
vious studies’.
Networth appears as a major determinant of stock and equity holding. Interestingly,
however, its importance decays as one focuses on more complex ﬁnancial assets (i.e., equity
vs. stocks) or as one restricts attention to equity holders.
Perhaps next in importance, (formal) education raises the chance of holding stocks or
equity. Not surprisingly, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2000) indicate that it is one of the
most robust variables in regressions for stockholding after controlling for all potential deter-
minants. Agents who did not complete high school, controlling for all other determinants,
tend to hold less stocks that comparable agents who received a high school diploma. Gradu-
ating from college increases signiﬁcantly the probability of observing equity (stocks) among
the agent’s assets. This holds true for all regressions.
The plots in Figure 3 show the eﬀects of networth and education in the estimated
probability of holding stocks from Regression (2). The upper line corresponds to college-
graduated household, while the lower curve to a household with incomplete high-school.
The horizontal axis corresponds to networth. The variables that are not displayed are
evaluated at its median value. At a null networth, the estimated probabilities of holding
stocks are 22% for high school dropouts and 59% for college graduates. As networth
increases, these probabilities eventually approach 1. Contrast Panels a, b and c in Figure
3; they only diﬀer on the range of networth considered. Hence, education is a strong
determinant of stockholding, but its importance decreases till it vanishes at the highest
levels of networth.
240
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Figure 3 : Estimated probability of holding stocks
With regard to personal characteristics, the probability of holding stocks and equity
increases with age, and is higher for white-race, married households who do not have kids.
Work characteristics are less important. The dummy for certainty on future income, a
coarse measure of non-ﬁnancial income risk, is not robust, being - as expected - positive
in the regressions involving to hold equity/stocks, but reversing its sign for the decision of
holding stocks for equity holders.
We fear that some variables other than formal education might be capturing part of our
unobserved ﬁnancial literacy. Consider, for instance, the value of the household’s house as
a share of total assets, which has a negative impact on the probability holding equity or
stocks. Houses are illiquid and indivisible, and so in some sense they restrict the capability
of investing in the ﬁnancial market. However, it is plausible that individuals with a higher
share of their wealth invested in their house choose such concentration because they face
higher ambiguity when dealing with ﬁnancial assets. Or consider, for that matter, the
dummy “professional occupation?” whose positive sign could be interpreted as suggesting
25that households whose occupation is probably associated to higher capacity in processing
information are indeed more inclined to hold stocks. Unfortunately, our inability to observe
ﬁnancial-speciﬁc knowledge prevents us from leaving our speculative position in this regard.
The positive connection between education and stockholding is, nonetheless, clear and
strong.
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"6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has argued that although the existence of information acquisition costs is not a
plausible solution to the Participation Puzzlew i t h i nt h ef r a m e w o r kp r o v i d e db yE Ut h e o r y ,
it may be so within the framework of CEU theory. Information costs per se are not capable
of explaining the observed widespread low stockholdings, but ambiguity aversion can.
Unfortunately, at the moment it is not possible to write down a full-blown model of
information acquisition within this generalization of EU theory, mostly because a full un-
derstanding of belief updating that parallels that of Bayes’ rule is yet to come. The
approach, however, seems promising, as our model suggests.
The empirical evidence, on the other hand, hints strongly towards an explanation of
this sort, as (formal) education is strongly related to participation in the samples analyzed,
even when using proper controls. Equity-market participants tend to be more educated
than non participants. Although more reﬁned data that allows for a clearer identiﬁcation
of equity-market related knowledge is a must in order to gain assurance on the results, what
this paper has shown strongly suggest the empirical plausibility of the argument.
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